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I.  Introduction 
There she was. Dressed in a revealing corset, it was the former 
spokesman for the “Breakfast of Champions.”1  Those same people who 
first saw her, while roaming through the cereal aisle of their local 
supermarket, remember her from her iconic image and reputation as being 
the gold medalist of the 1976 Olympic decathlon.  No longer did she adorn 
the cereal aisle.  Now she looked up at them from the cover of Vanity Fair.2  
She reintroduced herself to the world with three simple words: “Call Me 
Caitlyn.”3 
 
 *. Paul Jones is a third-year Juris Doctor candidate at University of California, Hastings 
College of the Law.  He obtained his undergraduate degree in Political Science at the University 
of South Florida.  This note is dedicated to the three people whose guidance and love made this 
possible: his mother, Paulette Jones and his grandparents, Holley and Ruthie Jones. 
 1. Caitlyn Jenner, formerly Bruce Jenner, was the spokesman for Wheaties from 1977 to 
1984. 
 2. VANITY FAIR, June 2015.  
 3. VANITY FAIR, supra note 2.  
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Caitlyn Jenner, formerly Bruce Jenner, debuted her gender transition 
from male to female before countless millions.4  Long after her athletic 
career ended, but before transitioning, she found new fame and stardom as 
the stepfather to the Kardashian clan.5  But the stepfather of one of cable’s 
most-watched reality television shows had stepped into the spotlight 
herself.  With those three simple words, Jenner would now become a 
powerful figure in the LGBTQ movement.6 
Before Jenner officially transitioned, the topic of LGBTQ visibility in 
athletics remained in the continuing spotlight for the past few years.  On 
the cover of another nationally circulated staple of the magazine industry, 
the first male athlete, currently playing, from any of the four North 
American professional team sports7 publically revealed that he was gay.8  
He would play again for a short time with the Brooklyn Nets before 
announcing his retirement in November 2014.9 
The envelope was pushed further when the St. Louis Rams drafted a 
former University of Missouri football player named Michael Sam.10  He 
would become the first openly gay male player to be drafted in the NFL.11  
Yet, the honor was short-lived.  Sam was cut from the Rams at the end of 
training camp.12  The former defensive end called the Montreal Alouettes 
of the Canadian Football League home for a short while.13  His tenure there 
was troubled and concluded with Sam publically stating that “[i]t was a 
really last call to go to the CFL.14  I never really wanted to go to the CFL”15  
He has since gone back to school to pursue further education.16 
 
 4. Vanity Fair Circulation Demographics, CONDE NAST, http://www.condenast.com/ 
brands/vanity-fair/media-kit/print (last visited Mar. 19. 2016). 
 5. Keeping Up with the Kardashians (E! television broadcast). 
 6. LGBTQ stands for individuals who are lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and 
questioning. 
 7. Nate Silver, The ‘Big Five’ in North American Pro Sports, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Apr. 4, 
2014), http://fivethirtyeight.com/datalab/theres-a-big-five-in-north-american-pro-sports/ (The top 
four North American sports are baseball, basketball, football and hockey). 
 8. SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 2013. 
 9. Jason Collins, Parting shot: Jason Collins announces NBA retirement in his own words, 
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Nov. 14. 2014),  http://www.si.com/nba/2014/11/19/jason-collins-retire 
ment-nba. 
 10. Joe Drape, Steve Eder And Billy Witz, Before Coming Out, a Hard Time Growing Up, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/12/sports/football/for-nfl-prospect 
-michael-sam-upbringing-was-bigger-challenge-than-coming-out-as-gay.html?_r=0. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Nick Wagoner, Michael Sam cut by Rams, ESPN.GO (Aug. 31, 2014), http://espn.go 
.com/nfl/story/_/id/11431047/michael-sam-cut-st-louis-rams.  
 13. Michael Sam ‘never’ wanted to play for the Montreal Alouettes, THE ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Sept. 26, 2015), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/michael-sam-nfl-montreal-
alouettes-1.3245323.  
 14. Id.  
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But what if the envelope was pushed even further?  Jenner revealed 
his transition long after his athletic career ended.  Collins came out during 
his professional career.  And Sam came out just after college.  What would 
have happened if Collins or Sam had publically come out during their 
college careers?  What would have happened if Jenner had transitioned 
during or even before her Olympic career? 
Some think Collins’ and Sam’s careers were diminished by publically 
announcing their sexual orientations, yet both were able to still play at the 
college and professional levels.  But, for athletes such as Jenner who may 
be transgender, the opportunity to play in college may never arise. 
This note will examine the history and obstacles transgender 
individuals have faced in the past.  The note will also discuss how Title VII 
and Title IX may be interpreted to offer protections to transgender student 
athletes.  The note will also examine what are the obstacles involved, both 
legislatively and judicially, before transgender student athletes are afforded 
full recognition that discrimination based on gender identity is 
discrimination because of sex. 
II.  What Is the History of Transgender Rights? 
The history of the transgender movement begins within the last 
century or so.  The idea of being born female in a male body or male in a 
female body was not recognized as a biological or psychological 
condition—now named “gender dysphoria,”—until the 20th century.17  
People who were born with this condition before then were all regaled to 
the term “cross-dresser.”18 
Cross-dressing has long been practiced in the realms of 
entertainment.19  Cross-dressing was common for stage actors.20  Being a 
stage actor was thought to be a demeaning profession for a woman.21  Men 
played many of history’s most famous roles, including William 
 
 15. Id.  
 16. Id. 
 17. Gender Dysphoria, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, https://www.psychologytoday.com/ 
conditions/gender-dysphoria (last visited Mar. 19, 2016).  See also Karl Bryant, Gender 
dysphoria (GD), ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/science/gender-
dysphoria (last visited Mar. 19, 2016). 
 18. See Cross-dressing, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary 
/cross%E2%80%93dressing (last visited Mar. 19, 2016). 
 19. Fraser McAlpine, The Brits and Cross-Dressing: A History, BBC AMERICA, http:// 
www.bbcamerica.com/anglophenia/2014/11/brits-cross-dressing-history (last visited Mar. 19, 
2016). 
 20. Fraser, supra note 19.  
 21. Id.  
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Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet.22  This would eventually evolve into a 
form of comic relief with men cross-dressing for the primary purpose of 
entertainment.23 
It was when cross-dressing was taken off the stage that Victorian 
mores were challenged.  “Fanny & Stella: The Young Men Who Shocked 
Victorian England”24 tells the story of just that,25 with Mrs. Fanny Graham 
and Miss Stella Boulton, respectively Frederick William Park and Ernest 
Boulton.26  These young individuals regularly donned women’s clothing.27  
Both would perform in the theaters of London but the male personas of 
Frederick and Ernest, respectively, were the actual characters Fanny and 
Stella portrayed.28  Suitors vexed by their exotic nature and femininity 
wooed both women.29  Fanny would come to describe Stella as her sister.30  
Stella had dressed in clothes of the opposite sex during her childhood as 
“Ernest.”31 
The diagnosis of gender dysphoria was not available to Fanny and 
Stella at this time.  Fanny and Stella were arrested and charged with 
sodomy.32  Homosexuality was made criminal under the Buggery Act 1533 
and its subsequent reincarnations.33  The jury acquitted both34 but Victorian 
England’s prejudices, coupled with puritanical foundings, had already 
permeated the New World colonies in the Americas.  Homosexuality 
remained illegal throughout North America.35  It wouldn’t be until 
Lawrence v. Texas36 that the Supreme Court struck down sodomy laws 
targeting the community.37 
 
 22. Id.  
 23. Id.  
 24. Max Fincher, Journal of the History of Sexuality, Vol. 24, Iss. 1, 165 (2015) (reviewing 
NEIL MCKENNA, FANNY & STELLA: THE YOUNG MEN WHO SHOCKED VICTORIAN ENGLAND 
(2013)). 
 25. Fincher, supra note 24. 
 26. Id.  
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id.  
 33. Buggery Act 1533, 25 Hen. VIII  c. 6 (Eng.); See also The Offences against the Person 
Act 1828, 9 Geo. IV c.31 (Eng.). 
 34. Fincher, supra note 24. 
 35. History of Sodomy Law, GLAPN, http://www.glapn.org/sodomylaws/history/history. 
htm (last updated Apr. 15, 2007). 
 36. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 37. Id. at 578.  
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The “T” in LBGTQ still largely had been ignored in the gay rights 
movement, which started with the Mattachine Society38 and its female 
counterpart The Daughters of Bilitis,39 and escalated with the Stonewall 
Riots.40  In 2007, the only openly gay member of Congress41 scrubbed 
transgender protections from the ENDA when trying to get it approved by 
Congress.42  There are many legal impediments to the government’s 
recognition of gender transition and identity.  Some states simply require a 
physician’s attestment that the individual has had a gender-related medical 
history.43  Other states require the individual to have sexual reassignment 
surgery, which can include up to sterilization.44  These impediments lead to 
transgender individuals being misgendered45 on their birth certificates, 
passports, and even driver’s licenses. 
Recently, there was a movie about the Stonewall Riots that was the 
subject of controversy.  The Roland Emmerich film titled “Stonewall” 
chronicled the events of a group of young gay men standing up against 
police persecution of Christopher Street gay bars.46  Many commentators 
lambasted the movie.  The Roland Emmerich film has been called a “white- 
and cis-washing” of a pivotal moment of the gay rights movement.47  There 
were calls for a boycott of the film because many felt the film’s 
fictionalized account ignored the transgender women who were 
instrumental in the start and duration of the Riots.48 
 
 38. Susan Stryker, The Transgender Movement Welcomes Gay Allies, N.Y. TIMES, http:// 
www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/10/15/are-trans-rights-and-gay-rights-still-allies/the-
transgender-movement-welcomes-gay-allies (last updated Oct. 8, 2014); Gay rights movement, 
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/topic/gay-rights-movement (last visited 
Mar. 19, 2016). 
 39. Gay rights movement, supra note 38. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Stryker, supra note 38 (Barney Frank was the only openly gay member of U.S. 
Congress). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Changing Birth Certificate Sex Designations: State-By-State Guidelines, LAMBDA 
LEGAL, http://www.lambdalegal.org/know-your-rights/transgender/changing-birth-certificate-sex-
designations (last updated Feb. 3, 2015). 
 44. Id. 
 45. See Misgender, OXFORD DICTIONARY, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition 
/american_english/misgender (last visited Mar. 20, 2016) (Misgendered is defined as referring to 
a transgender person by using a word, especially a pronoun or form of address that does not 
correctly reflect the gender with which they identify). 
 46. STONEWALL (Centropolis Entertainment 2015). 
 47. Raquel Willis, 5 Tweets That Sum Up Why People Are Upset About Stonewall, 
PRIDE.COM (Aug. 12, 2015), http://www.pride.com/lgbt/2015/8/05/5-tweets-sum-why-people-
are-boycotting-stonewall. 
 48. Id. 
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All of these actions can be seen as culminating in a belief that the “T” 
in LGBT has been ignored.  Many in the trans community feel as if the 
mainstream gay rights movement only includes the trans community when 
it is convenient.49  The gay rights movement’s largest organization—the 
Human Rights Campaign—has come under fire for predominantly 
advocating for causes that largely benefit only gay men and lesbians.  
Additionally, there is animosity not only between the Human Rights 
Campaign and the trans community, but many others in the gay community 
that feel like the Human Rights Campaign seeks to heteronormalize50 all 
things LGBTQ.51 
The Human Rights Campaign was the main driving force for the 
legalization of same-sex marriage across the United States.52  The 
showdown between the liberal and conservative blocs of the Supreme 
Court ended with Justice Anthony Kennedy pinning the majority opinion in 
Obergefell v. Hodges,53 holding that the states must allow gays to marry.54 
While this was a coup for the gay rights movement, the trans 
community seems yet to gain a foothold within the mainstream policy 
agenda until recent years. 
III.  What Is the History of Sex-Segregation in Athletics? 
The history of sex-segregation within athletics begins with sex-
segregation itself.  Historically, women were not formally educated.55  
Their upbringing was confined to learning household duties from the 
female members of the family unit.56  Those who were formally educated 
may not have been exposed to athletic activities as society knows today.57 
It wasn’t until the 19th century that women began to be more formally 
educated.58  The continuing belief was that women were not as intelligent 
as men, leading to sex-segregated education based on gender stereotypes.59  
 
 49. Stryker, supra note 38. 
 50. Heteronormativity is the belief or attitude that heterosexual societal constructs are the 
only normal and natural expressions of societal behavior. 
 51. Monica Roberts, Why The Transgender Community Hates The Human Rights 
Campaign, SAN FRANCISCO SENTINEL, http://www.sanfranciscosentinel.com/?p=7291 (last 
visited Mar. 22, 2016). 
 52. Roberts, supra note 51.  
 53. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 54. Id. at 2607 – 08. 
 55. Women’s History in America, WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL CENTER, http://www.wic.org/ 
misc/history.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2016).  
 56. Women’s History in America, supra note 55. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
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This belief led to many women being discouraged from pursuing higher 
education and relegated them into domesticity.60 
These attitudes that the female sex’s role was within the domestic 
sphere transferred over to women’s ability to participate in athletics.61  
Athletics were thought to be traditionally masculine because society feared 
that athletics might interfere with women’s menstruation cycle.62  All 
professional athletic teams were comprised of men. 
World War II brought changing gender attitudes.  The rise of the 
“Rosie the Riveter” character took women from their homes into the 
workspace and into military service.63  World War II also saw an influx of 
women in athletics.64  Up until then, there was no such thing as a 
professional women’s sports team in the major North American sports.  It 
wasn’t until 1943 that there was a professional women’s sports team.65  The 
All-American Girls Baseball League was started as an attempt to substitute 
for Major League Baseball, which had been canceled due to World War 
II.66  The league lasted until 1954.67 Women finally broke the glass ceiling 
in the realm of professional sports. 
But there still remained an attitude that athletic sports must be 
segregated by sex.  And this attitude remains today, from professional 
sports to grade schools. 
IV.  How Does Title IX Apply to College Athletics? 
Congress passed Title IX in 1972.68  Title IX prohibited gender 
discrimination by any school receiving federal funds.69  The language 
explicitly states that “no person in the United States, shall, on the basis of 
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance.”70  No longer could colleges and 
 
 60. Id. 
 61. Richard C. Bell, A History of Women in Sport Prior to Title IX, THE SPORTS JOURNAL 
(Mar. 14, 2008)  http://thesportjournal.org/article/a-history-of-women-in-sport-prior-to-title-ix/. 
 62. Bell, supra note 61. 
 63. Id.  
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. KATHRYN CULLEN-DUPONT, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WOMEN’S HISTORY IN AMERICA 9–10 
(2nd ed, 2000). 
 68. United States Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92318, 86 Stat. 235 (1972) 
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688)) [hereinafter Title IX]. 
 69. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688. 
 70. 20 U.S.C. 1681(a). 
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universities, who received federal funding, exclude women from athletic 
programs. 
Men’s teams had existed for many years.  Due to this, to comply with 
the new federal restrictions colleges and universities created women’s 
teams as analogues.71  The beginning of the equaling of the genders in 
college athletics started with the formation of the Association of 
Intercollegiate Athletics for Women.72  Women were finally able to play 
college sports.  Title IX had opened the door for women to be seen as 
athletes themselves but the playing field was far from level. 
The sports landscape evolved but Title IX remains largely unchanged 
since its enactment.  Additionally, while Title IX provides equal 
opportunity to participate in athletic programs, two exceptions have left 
Title IX a hollow victory.  When the U.S. Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare73 was tasked with creating the regulations that 
would govern how Title IX would be implemented, two exceptions were 
created that allowed athletic teams to be segregated by sex: the competitive 
skill exception and the contact sports exception.74 
The competitive skill exception provides for gender-separate teams 
when “selection for such teams is based upon competitive skill.”75  The 
contact sports exception provides separation of sex when the sport has the 
“purpose or major activity of which involves bodily contact.”76  The 
regulation explicitly lists several contact sports: “boxing, wrestling, rugby, 
ice hockey, football [and] basketball.”77  Additionally, the regulation 
includes all “other sports [with] the purpose or major activity of which 
involves bodily contact.”78 
The exceptions have gutted Title IX.  Common sense suggests some 
sports would automatically be considered contact sports, such as the 
aforementioned activities, but where does it end?  In 2009, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court ruled that cheerleading was a contact sport.79 
 
 71. 1972 Title IX Enacted, HISTORY.COM, http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/title-
ix-enacted (last visited Mar. 26, 2016).  
 72. 1972 Title IX Enacted, supra note 71. 
 73. In 1979, the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare would split into two 
separate agencies: the Department of Education and the Department Health and Human Services. 
 74. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b). 
 75. Id.  
 76. Id.  
 77. Id. 
 78. Id.  
 79. Noffke ex rel. Swenson v. Bakke, 2009 WI 10 ¶23 (ruled that for the purposes of 
immunity from negligence claims that cheerleading was a sport that involves physical activity 
between parties). 
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These exceptions exclude every major North American professional 
sport from full Title IX protection.  As a concession, the regulations state 
that contact sports teams must be created for members of the opposite 
gender when there is sufficient interest.80  Schools must only provide equal 
athletic opportunity.81  But sporting opportunities have only been largely 
available to women for the past fifty years while athletics have been 
available to men for millennia.  The demographics demonstrate that interest 
in professional sports is still largely male-dominated.82  Due to this, there 
has been a lack of funding and concern to generate female interest in 
sports.83 
Notwithstanding the lack of interest and the exceptions, there may be 
hope for full protection under Title IX for college athletes.  The Supreme 
Court has decided to hear an appeal from the Fourth Circuit that may lead 
to transgender students receiving protections under Title IX.84  The plaintiff 
in G.G. v. Gloucester County Sch. Bd. is an underage transgender boy.85  
He was born female but started transitioning to male when he was twelve.86 
After beginning high school, he used a separate bathroom in the nurse’s 
office.87  He asked the school’s administration to use the male’s bathroom 
and received approval.88  The request soon became public knowledge and 
several parents expressed worry about a “girl” in the boys’ bathroom.89 
The local school district took up the issue and passed a resolution 
mandating that for “privacy” concerns that all students would have to use 
the restroom that corresponded with their biological sex.90  There was a 
provision that those with “gender identity issues” would be provided an 
“alternative” restroom facility.91 
The proponents of this resolution used commonly cited 
rationalizations for denying the plaintiff in G.G., a transgender male, the 
ability to use the bathroom corresponding with his gender identity.  
 
 80. A Policy Interpretation: Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, 
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/t9interp.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2016). 
 81. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c). 
 82. 1972 Title IX Enacted, supra note 71. 
 83. Id. 
 84. See G. G. v. Gloucester Country. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 
136 S. Ct. 2442 (2016). 
 85. G.G., 822 F.3d at 714. 
 86. G.G. v. Gloucester County Sch. Bd., No. 4:15cv54, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124905 at 
*3-5 (E.D. Va. Sep. 17, 2015). 
 87. Id. at *6. 
 88. Id.  
 89. Id. at *6 – 9. 
 90. Id. at *8. 
 91. Id. at *7. 
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Proponents were worried about the privacy of other students and the 
increased probability that sexual assault may occur.92  The young man 
whose simple request to use the bathroom that corresponded with his 
gender identity would later speak of the debate, “I was spoken about as if I 
were some sort of creature on a pedestal for everyone to mock and make 
their comments about as if my rights to privacy and equal treatment aren’t 
the same as everybody else’s.”93 
Similar arguments were used in a fight for an inclusive city ordinance 
that would protected against discrimination based on gender identity.94  The 
Houston Equal Rights Ordinance was originally approved by the Houston’s 
city council.95  But in a devastating blow, the Texas Supreme Court ruled 
that no such law could be enacted by legislative measure; it must be put 
before the electorate.96 
The measure was put on the ballot.97  Opponents of the measure 
launched a YouTube video “based on fear” and a fight for the protection of 
women’s privacy.98  The video contained a young girl entering a bathroom 
stall, followed by an older man.99  The words “No one is exempt.  Even 
registered sex offenders could follow young women or girls into the 
bathroom” played against ominous background music.100 
The voter turnout was the highest for a city election in Houston in 
twelve years.101  And the measure failed 60.97% to 39.03%.102 
The plaintiff in G.G. refused to accept the school district’s short-
sidedness, which was based on the same concerns of those who launched 
the disparaging video that defeated the Houston ballot measure.103  He 
 
 92. Id. at *8. 
 93. Michael K. Lavers, 4th Circuit to hear transgender student lawsuit, WASHINGTON 
BLADE (Jan. 26, 2016), http://www.washingtonblade.com/2016/01/26/4th-circuit-to-hear-trans 
gender-student-lawsuit/.  
 94. Russell Berman, How Bathroom Fears Conquered Transgender Rights in Houston, THE 
ATLANTIC (Nov. 3, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/11/how-bathroom-
fears-conquered-transgender-rights-in-houston/414016/.  
 95. Berman, supra note 94. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Campaign for Houston, Campaign for Houston - TV Spot 1, YOUTUBE.COM (Oct. 13, 
2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D7thOvSvC4E.  
 100. Campaign for Houston, supra note 99. 
 101. Matt Dempsy, Voter Turnout Highest Since 2003, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, http://www. 
houstonchronicle.com/politics/election/local/article/Voter-turnout-highest-since-2003-6609254. 
php (last updated Nov. 4, 2015). 
 102. Cumulative Report – Official, HARRISCOUNTYVOTES, http://www.harrisvotes.com/ 
HISTORY/20151103/cumulative/cumulative_9.jpg (last visited Mar. 23, 2016). 
 103. G.G., LEXIS 124905, at *10 – 11. 
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brought suit under Title IX for discrimination on the basis of sex.104  The 
school district argued for dismissal because Title IX does not include 
discrimination based on gender identity.105  G.G. posited that Title IX’s 
employment counterpart Title VII has been interpreted to include gender 
identity with the language “because of sex.”106 
The district court concluded that the meaning of Title IX’s prohibition 
of discrimination on the “basis of sex” was likely to mean “biological 
sex.”107  The court dismissed the plaintiff’s case108 and did not give heed to 
how the decision would affect young transgender students, such as the 
plaintiff.  In an interview after the decision, the young man said, “Right 
now I feel humiliated and dysphoric every time I’m forced to use a separate 
restroom facility just so I can carry out a basic function of human life.”109 
He continued to fight.  He appealed to the Fourth Circuit.  The Fourth 
Circuit bucked against judicial stubbornness about gender identity.  The 
court ultimately held that the Government’s position, asserting that denial 
of transgender students’ access to the restrooms corresponding with their 
gender identity violated Title IX, was permitted and reasonable.110  The 
court also discussed the various levels of agency deference.111  As long as 
the agency’s promulgation and interpretation of its own regulations was 
reasonable and not inconsistent with previous interpretations, the agency 
was allowed broad discretion pertaining to interpretation and 
enforcement.112 
The Office for Civil Rights’ (OCR) enabling statute was ambiguous 
but their interpretation pursuant to what “sex” means was reasonable.113  
The Fourth Circuit reasoned that because OCR’s interpretation of its own 
enabling statute was reasonable, the agency had the ability to promulgate 
regulations relating to gender identity.114  If these regulations were 
reasonable and not inconsistent with previous interpretations, the district 
court should have deferred to the agency’s interpretation. 
 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at *13. 
 106. See, e.g., Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 2011); Smith v. City of 
Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 574 – 75 (6th Cir. 2004); Finkle v. Howard Cnty., Md., 12 F. Supp. 3d 780, 
788 (D. Md. 2014); Lopez v. River Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic Grp., Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 653, 
660 (S.D. Tex. 2008); see also Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 107. G.G., LEXIS 124905, at *23 – 24. 
 108. Id. at *43. 
 109. Lavers, supra note 93.   
 110. G.G., 822 F.3d at 722 – 23. 
 111. Id. at 719 – 24. 
 112. This is called “Auer deference.” Infra notes 214 to 217 and accompanying text. 
 113. G.G., 822 F.3d at 722 – 24. 
 114. Id.  
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The Fourth Circuit opined that while the OCR’s interpretation of its 
regulation was novel, it was consistent with previous policy and reasonable 
in its interpretation.115  And thus, the district court should have deferred to 
the OCR’s interpretation. The district court was reversed and the case was 
remanded for further proceedings.116  But the fight is not over. The school 
board appealed and was granted review by the Supreme Court. 
If the Supreme Court affirms the Fourth Circuit’s opinion, a precedent 
would be set that Title IX includes a prohibition against discrimination on 
the basis of gender identity.  It is uncertain what such a decision would do 
for the contact sport exception.  If the same reasoning was applied to the 
contact sport exception, an educational institution with separate teams 
would not be permitted to prohibit a transgender student from participating 
on the team that corresponded with his or her gender identity.  Such a broad 
sweeping decision may apply to college settings.  If so, transgender student 
athletes, similarly to the plaintiff in G.G., could not be prohibited from 
joining the sports team that corresponds with their gender.  Transgender 
athletes would no longer have to hide or delay transitioning their gender 
identities for the chance of a college career, which for many athletes is the 
stepping-stone to a professional career. 
V.  Does “Because of Sex” Apply to Gender Identity? 
There have been other advancements in anti-discrimination 
protections.  Over eighteen states have some form of statewide legislation 
that prohibits discrimination based on gender identity in housing, 
employment and/or other areas of public accommodation.117  There have 
also been enactments of local municipal laws prohibiting gender identity 
discrimination.118  Governors have also issued executive orders banning 
discrimination in employment amongst state agencies.119 
But there is no recognized federal legislation prohibiting 
discrimination based on gender identity.  The Employment Non-
Discrimination Act (ENDA) did not include gender identity when first 
introduced in 2007.120  The language was restored when reintroduced in 
2009 but failed to garner enough support to be enacted into law.121  But 
ENDA may not be needed.  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act provides that 
 
 115. Id.  
 116. Id. at 723. 
 117. Know Your Rights: Transgender People and the Law, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/ 
know-your-rights/transgender-people-and-law (last visited Mar. 25, 2016). 
 118. Know Your Rights: Transgender People and the Law, supra note 117. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2007, H.R. 3685, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 121. Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2009, H.R. 2981, 111th Cong. (2009). 
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no employer may discriminate because of “race, color, religion, sex or 
national origin.”122  “Because of sex” has historically been narrowly 
construed as “anatomical sex” or “biological sex,” similarly to how the 
district court interpreted “sex” in G.G. 
This issue has been raised before. Paula Grossman was a teacher in the 
Bernards Township of Somerset County, New Jersey.123  She had begun 
her career as Paul Grossman at the school district in 1957.124  She 
underwent sex reassignment surgery in 1971.125  Several months later, she 
was suspended and subsequently fired.126  She brought suit under several 
statutes, including Title VII, alleging wrongful termination based on 
discrimination because of sex.127  The school district alleged that 
Grossman’s firing was due to the fact that her sexual assignment surgery 
would cause the children emotional harm.128 
The district court parsed Grossman’s termination as not “because of 
sex” but a termination because of a “change in sex.”129  The court reasoned 
that the absence of an intent to include gender identity from the legislative 
history was definitive evidence that Title VII’s language “because of sex” 
did not include any protections for transgender individuals.130 
Title VII was enacted in 1964 and subsequently amended in 1972 to 
increase the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC) 
enforcement power.131  Gender dysphoria, originally known as gender 
identity disorder, did not receive official recognition as a condition until it 
was added to the DSM-III in 1980.132  It is likely legislators may have 
never considered gender identity when drafting Title VII protections 
because the medical establishment had yet to recognize gender dysphoria 
as a legitimate medical condition.  That may explain its absence from the 
legislative history. 
But, the legislative history may have been a poor point of start.  The 
“because of sex” provision was a last minute amendment added one day 
 
 122. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.  
 123. Grossman v. Bernards Tp. Bd. of Educ., No. 74-1904, 1975 WL 302, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 
10, 1975). 
 124. Id.  
 125. Id. at *2. 
 126. Id. at *1.  
 127. Id. at *2 – 4. 
 128. Id. at *2.  
 129. Id. at *4.  
 130. Id.  
 131. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2; see Id. § 2000e-4. 
 132. See DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, (American 
Psychological Association, 3rd ed. 1980). 
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before the House of Representatives approved the bill.133  It passed mere 
hours later with limited to no hearing or debate on the amendment.134 
A proper start to a judicial interpretation should have begun with 
considering the overall purpose of Title VII.  The Supreme Court stated 
that the “objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII [was] 
plain.”135  Congress wanted to “achieve equality of employment 
opportunities” and remove “artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to 
employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the 
basis of racial or other impermissible classification.”136  Such sweeping 
language by the high court could mean that Title VII should be construed 
as broadly as possible to prohibit invidious discrimination. 
A district court took heed of the Supreme Court’s word and held that 
sex stereotyping did include prescriptive stereotypes such as men should 
wear their hair short, and thus was actionable under Title VII.137  The court 
went on to say Congress had “intended to attack these stereotyped 
characterizations” that many employers, as well as members of the public, 
may have about protected classes.138  Congress wanted people to be 
“judged by their intrinsic worth.”139  Yet, a narrow interpretation of “sex” 
still followed. 
Courts held firm to the narrow interpretation, holding steadfast to the 
so-called plain meaning of the law while ignoring its spirit.  Several federal 
appellate courts held that Title VII did not include a protection against 
discrimination based on gender identity.140  Gender identity seemed to have 
been judicially excised from Title VII protection. 
 
 133. Jo Freeman, How “Sex” Got Into Title VII: Persistent Opportunism as a Maker of 
Public Policy, 9 LAW AND INEQUALITY: A JOURNAL OF THEORY AND PRACTICE 163, 163 – 64 
(1991).  
 134. Freeman, supra note 133. 
 135. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429 (1971). 
 136. Id.  
 137. Donohue v. Shoe Corp. of America, 337 F. Supp. 1357, 1358-59 (C.D. Cal. 1972). 
 138. Id. at 1359. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Sommers. Budget Mktq., Inc, 667 F.2d 748, 749 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding that summary 
judgment was proper against a transgender defendant’s Title VII claim that she was fired after 
requesting to use the female restroom facilities); Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co. 566 F.2d 
659, 663 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that dismissal for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a cause 
for which relief can be granted was proper after a transgender defendant was fired after she 
required a name change from human resources); Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 
1221-22 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that summary judgment was proper against a transgender 
defendant who fired because she used the female restroom because “transsexuals were not a 
protected class” under the 14th Amendment and were not deemed to have protection of Title VII). 
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But, some courts had a difference of opinion after the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins141  The plaintiff in Price 
Waterhouse had been described by male colleagues as “macho” and was 
told by her supervisor that if she acted more feminine her chances of 
promotion would increase.142  The plaintiff sued under Title VII for sex 
discrimination.143  The Supreme Court held that sex discrimination could 
take the form of sex stereotyping.144 
The Sixth Circuit in Smith v. City of Salem145 held that a transgender 
plaintiff’s Title VII claims were valid.146  The court reasoned that “sex 
stereotyping based on a person’s gender non-conforming behavior” is 
“impermissible discrimination.”147  The court ignored the labeling of 
“transsexual” because “a sex discrimination claim where the victim has 
suffered discrimination because of his or her gender nonconformity” was 
because of sex.148 
Because transgender individuals identify as the gender opposite their 
biological sex, this type of behavior may be viewed as gender 
nonconformity.  If there was an adverse employment action because of this 
gender nonconformity, it may constitute sex-stereotyping149 and because of 
that, it is actionable. 
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit concluded in Schwenk v. Hartford150 
that “gender” and “sex” had become interchangeable.151  The plaintiff was 
a transgender woman incarcerated in an all-male prison.152  She brought 
suit under the Gender Motivated Violence Act, alleging rape by a male 
prison guard.153  The Ninth Circuit concluded that the “because of gender” 
and “because of sex” language from the Gender Motivated Violence Act 
and Title VII, respectively, were interchangeable; gender nonconforming 
individuals were also protected under the Gender Motivated Violence 
Act.154 
 
 141. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 142. Id. at 235. 
 143. Id. at 231 – 32. 
 144. Id. at 250. 
 145. 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 146. Id. at 575. 
 147. Id.  
 148. Id.  
 149. Id. 
 150. 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 151. Id. at 1202. 
 152. Id. at 1193.  
 153. Id. at 1192. 
 154. Id. at 1201 – 03. 
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The plain meaning of “sex” and the plain meaning of “gender” are no 
longer societally the same.  The spectrum of sexuality has established that 
“sex” may mean your biological sex and “gender” may mean which 
biological sex societal norms you adopt.  If the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning is 
sound, gender is encompassed within “because of sex” language in Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act.  Therefore, the adverse employment action 
because of gender identity may be actionable under Title VII. 
Additionally, the EEOC has been charged with creating interpretative 
guidelines and rulings for Title VII.155  The EEOC issued a ruling in Mia 
Macy v. Eric Holder156 in which the Commission concluded that “claims of 
discrimination based on gender identity, are cognizable under Title VII’s 
sex discrimination prohibition.”157  The ruling cited Price Waterhouse’s 
sex-stereotyping line of doctrine as part of their analysis as to why gender 
identity must be included under Title VII.158  This interpretation was a 
departure from earlier EEOC decisions and earlier Title VII litigation.  
Some federal courts were edging towards being more inclusive but the 
EEOC interpretation now gives the ability to push further litigation. 
The federal circuit dispute coupled with the EEOC’s ruling may be 
enough to force the Supreme Court to grant certiorari to decide the 
interpretation of “because of sex” as it pertains to transgender coverage 
under Title VII. If the Supreme Court did favor the inclusion of a 
prohibition based on gender identity under Title VII, it would provide a 
remedy in employment law for all transgender individuals who may have 
received an adverse employment action. 
VI.  What Is an Employee Under Title VII? 
Title VII is a powerful tool to ensure no one is discriminated against 
because he or she is a member of a protected class.  Remedies provided 
under Title VII are only available if there has been an adverse employment 
action.  An adverse employment action is defined as “an action” that 
“materially affects the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.”159  
Generally, all employers with over fifteen employees fall under the 
purview of Title VII.160  Federal and state government employees are 
provided protection as well as private employees.161 
 
 155. 42 U.S. Code § 2000e–4. 
 156. Mia Macy v. Eric Holder, EEOC Appeal No. 0120120821 (EEOC Apr. 20, 2012). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2). 
 160. Id. § 2000e(b). 
 161. Id.  
JONES_PRODUCTION_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/22/2016  4:25 PM 
2017 CAN I PLAY TOO? 83 
But the definition of “employee” has been the subject of much debate. 
Generally, an employee under Title VII is simply “an individual employed 
by an employer.”162  The plain language is ambiguous, and courts have 
been trying to interpret it through various case law.  Some courts seem to 
have taken to adopting the common law test to determine who an 
“employee” is under Title VII. 
The common law test has evolved from the Restatement (Second) of 
Agency § 220.163  Other courts have developed a different approach.  The 
plaintiff in Spirides v. Reinhardt164 wanted to bring suit under Title VII for 
sex discrimination.165  The issue was whether she was an employee or an 
independent contractor.166  The DC Circuit of Appeals focused on the 
“‘economic realities’ of the work relationship.”167  The court went on to 
state that the “test calls for application of general principles of the law of 
agency to undisputed or established facts.  Consideration of all of the 
circumstances surrounding the work relationship is essential, and no one 
factor is determinative.”168  The court also emphasized that the “extent of 
the employer’s right to control the ‘means and manner’ of the worker’s 
performance is the most important factor” when determining if there is an 
employer-employee relationship.169  The court stated that if “an employer 
has the right to control and direct the work of an individual, not only as to 
 
 162. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). 
 163. (1)  A servant is a person employed to perform services in the affairs of another and who 
with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the services is subject to the other’s 
control or right to control. 
(2)  In determining whether one acting for another is a servant or an independent contractor, the 
following matters of fact, among others, are considered: 
(a)  the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over the details of the 
work; 
(b)  whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; 
(c)  the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done 
under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision; 
(d)  the skill required in the particular occupation; 
(e)  whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of 
work for the person doing the work; 
(f)  the length of time for which the person is employed; 
(g)  the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job; 
(h)  whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the employer; 
(i)  whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of master and servant; and 
(j)  whether the principal is or is not in business. 
 164. 613 F.2d 826 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
 165. Id. at 827-28. 
 166. Id.  
 167. Id. at 831 – 32. 
 168. Id. at 831. 
 169. Id. 
JONES(DO NOT DELECT) 11/22/2016  4:25 PM 
84 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [39:1 
the result to be achieved but also as to the details by which that result is 
achieved, an employer/employee relationship is likely to exist.”170  The 
D.C. Circuit also listed several factors to consider when making the 
determination: 
(1)  the kind of occupation, with reference to whether the work 
usually is done under the direction of a supervisor or is done by a 
specialist without supervision; 
(2)  the skill required in the particular occupation; 
(3)  whether the “employer” or the individual in question 
furnishes the equipment used and the place of work; 
(4)  the length of time during which the individual has worked; 
(5)  the method of payment, whether by time or by the job; 
(6)  the manner in which the work relationship is terminated; I. e., 
by one or both parties, with or without notice and explanation; 
(7)  whether annual leave is afforded; 
(8)  whether the work is an integral part of the business of the 
“employer”; 
(9)  whether the worker accumulates retirement benefits; 
(10)  whether the “employer” pays social security taxes; and 
(11)  the intention of the parties. 
Additionally, some courts have relied on legislative histories of other 
federal statutes or employment protections to interpreting the meaning of 
“employee” under Title VII.171  The Supreme Court has ruled on several 
different cases determining who is an “employee” under the National Labor 
Relations Act172, the Social Security Act173 and the Fair Labor Standards 
Act174  Subsequent to judicial interpretations, Congress amended to narrow 
the definition of “employee” in the aforementioned acts.175 
Specifically, the National Relations Labor Act has been the subject of 
scrutiny.  Many of the provisions of Title VII were modeled after the 
National Relations Labor Act, but Congress chose not to import the 
National Relations Labor Act’s narrowed definition of “employee” to Title 
VII.176 
 
 170. Id. at 832. 
 171. See Nancy E. Dowd, The Test of Employee Status: Economic Realities and Title VII, 26 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 75 (1984). 
 172. See 29 U.S.C. § 151–169; see also NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111 (1944). 
 173. See 42 U.S.C. § 410; See also U. S. v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704 (1947). 
 174. See 29 U.S.C. § 203.  See also Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722 
(1947). 
 175. Dowd, supra note 171. 
 176. Id. 
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This has led some to theorized that by declining to define “employee” 
under Title VII, Congress indicated that it wanted “employee” to be 
construed as broadly as possible.177  But courts have largely ignored this.178  
Court still rely on the common law tests to determine which individuals are 
employees. 
VII.  Are Student Athletes Employees Subject to Title VII Protection? 
Since Title IX only applies to educational institutions who receive 
federal funding, private universities who do not receive federal funding 
may escape Title IX’s prohibitions.179  But even private universities must 
comply with Title VII protections because universities are employers.180  
Title VII may be the only powerful tool transgender athletes have to ensure 
they will not be left on the bench.  And to be protected, college athletes 
must be considered as employees. 
As previously stated, Title VII borrowed from the National Labor 
Relations Act, but the two statutes’ definitions of “employee” have split 
into two separate doctrines of jurisprudence.  If some are right and 
Congress did intend against a wide definition of employee under Title VII, 
are college athletes employees for the purposes of Title VII? 
The determination of whether college athletes are employees was 
raised in the context of the National Labor Relations Act when college 
football players sought to unionize for the purposes of collective 
bargaining.181  The football players were found to be employees under the 
definition of the National Labor Relations Act but the National Labor 
Relations Board declined jurisdiction over their petition and dismissed it 
upon rehearing.182 
Further examinations must consider the “employee test” based on the 
principles of agency.183  The putative master is the university or athlete.  
The putative servant is the student athlete.  The servant “perform[s] 
services in the affairs of another and who with respect to the physical 
conduct in the performance of the service is subject to the other’s control or 
 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). 
 180. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). 
 181. See Northwestern Univ. & College Athletes Players Ass’n., 362 N.L.R.B. 167 (2015) 
[hereinafter Northwestern Univ.]. 
 182. Id. 
 183. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220. 
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right to control.”184  To determine if the student athlete is a servant, there 
are a number of factors to consider185: 
(a)  the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may 
exercise over the details of the work; 
(b)  whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct 
occupation or business; 
(c)  the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the 
locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the 
employer or by a specialist without supervision; 
(d)  the skill required in the particular occupation; 
(e)  whether the employer or the workman supplies the 
instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person 
doing the work; 
(f)  the length of time for which the person is employed; 
(g)  the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job; 
(h)  whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the 
employer; 
(i)  whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation 
of master and servant; and 
(j)  whether the principal is or is not in business. 
The analysis begins with an examination of how much control the 
master—the employer school—has over the servant—employee athlete.  
The student athlete is engaged in a distinct occupation or business.  College 
athletics may be considered a distinct business.186  The commercial and 
economic ventures related to college athletics create millions of dollars for 
the university employers.187  If this is indeed a distinct business, the work is 
performed under the university employer through its agent: the coach. 
The coaches of these athletic teams are responsible for student athlete 
employees.  The student athletes must adhere to the demands of the 
university employers’ agents to remain on their respective teams.  On most 
teams, the student athletes must try out before participating on the team.188  
Each team demands a certain ability of skill to compete effectively.189  The 
university employers supply the tools and the places for the student athletes 
 
 184. Id.  
 185. Id.  
 186. See Kevin McGuire, NCAA revenue jumps closer to $1 billion, NBC SPORTS (Mar. 11, 
2015), http://collegefootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2015/03/11/ncaa-revenue-jumps-closer-to-1-bill 
ion/. 
 187. McGuire, supra note at 186. 
 188. Playing College Sport Without a Scholarship, COLLEGE SPORTS SCHOLARSHIPS, 
http://www.collegesportsscholarships.com/team-walk-on-tryout.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2016).  
 189. Playing College Sport Without a Scholarship, supra note 188. 
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to work.190  The universities have playing fields and sports equipment for 
the student athletes to use.191 
In some sports, such as football, student athletes may engage in 
athletic-related activities up to fifty hours a week.192  While some sports 
may only be during “seasons,” some student athletes may be involved in 
the athletic programs several to all years of their matriculation.193 
Yet, there may be some difficulty in ascertaining the method of 
compensation.  Some student athletes receive scholarships in turn for 
participating in college athletic programs.194  Some scholarships may be 
thousands of dollars a year.195  Additionally, there may be intangible 
compensation in the forms of the admiration and praise of their fellow 
students, which may lead to enhanced popularity around the college 
campus for performing well for the college employer.196  Also, college 
athletes may have better nutritional and health opportunities, or increase 
academic support, leading to more favorable grades.197  Furthermore, the 
compensation is subject to the student athletes obeying the educational 
institution’s rules.198  If the student athlete does not adhere, the 
compensation, such as scholarships, may be withdrawn.199 
The university employers have control of the compensation of the 
student athlete.  However, the university employer’s may argue that their 
primary business goal is educating the students; and as an additional goal, 
the university employer seeks to produce well-rounded individuals.200 
Many students do not become involve in college athletics, but 
universities offer many other extracurricular activities to achieve their goals 
for well-rounded graduates.  Offering college athletics as an extracurricular 
activity is likely another method of the university’s goal of ensuing its 
graduates receive the best higher educational experience possible. 
 
 190. Northwestern, 362 N.L.R.B. at 17. 
 191. Id.  
 192. Steve Wieberg, Study: College Athletes Are Full-Time Workers, USA TODAY (Jan. 13, 
2008), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college/2008-01-12-athletes-full-time-work-study 
_N.htm.  
 193. Wieberg, supra note 192. 
 194. Id.  
 195. The Balancing and Benefits to Being a College Student Athlete, ANDGOSPORTS (Feb. 
27, 2015), https://www.andgosports.com/the-balancing-and-benefits-to-being-a-college-student-
athlete/. 
 196. The Balancing and Benefits to Being a College Student Athlete, supra note 195. 
 197. Id.  
 198. Lynn O’Shaughnessy, 8 Things You Should Know About Sports Scholarships, CBS 
NEWS (Sept. 20, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/8-things-you-should-know-about-sports-
scholarships/. 
 199. O’Shaughnessy, supra note 198. 
 200. The Balancing and Benefits to Being a College Student Athlete, supra note 195. 
JONES(DO NOT DELECT) 11/22/2016  4:25 PM 
88 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [39:1 
This issue is debatable.  Universities are businesses.  College athletics 
continue to bring in millions for various enterprises, including donations to 
the universities with prominent athletic programs.201  There has been 
litigation on whether student athletes are employees, but college athletics 
may still widely be considered an extracurricular activity, and not a 
legitimate, money-making business.202  While there may not be a 
widespread belief that there is an employer-employee relationship, 
litigation of the subject brings visibility, and that belief may spread among 
campuses all over the United States.  If the consideration of student athletes 
as employees gains broader visibility, there may be a shift in the belief that 
there is an employee-employer relationship between the student athlete and 
the university employer. 
The student athletes are completely reliant on the universities to 
provide the instrumentalities and places of work.  Universities compensate 
the student athletes with scholarships and other intangible rewards.203  The 
Sixth Circuit has held that for purpose of whether an individual is an 
employee, the definition should be construed to include “the full range of 
workers who may be subject to the harms the statute was designed to 
prevent, unless such workers are excluded by a specific statutory 
exception.”204 
As of right now, transgender student athletes may not be able to 
receive the protection of Title VII, as well as Title IX, due to restrictive 
interpretations of “because of sex” and differing interpretations of what an 
employee is or isn’t.  But recently, the EEOC has been responsive to 
include transgender individuals under of Title VII protection.  Additionally, 
there has been a movement to consider college athletes employees, 
deserving of labor law protection.  Coupled together, this can combat the 
evils Title VII was enacted to stop.205  
VIII.  How Much Deference Is the EEOC Granted? 
The EEOC—or the OCR pursuant to Title IX—could promulgate 
regulations for the protection of transgender student athletes.  Yet, these are 
merely executive agencies enacted by statute with interpretative, regulatory 
and enforcement power.206  Both agencies are still subject to judicial 
 
 201. See McGuire, supra note 186. 
 202. See Northwestern Univ. & College Athletes Players Ass’n., 362 N.L.R.B. 167 (2015). 
 203. See The Balancing and Benefits to Being a College Student Athlete, supra note 195; 
Northwestern Univ. & College Athletes Players Ass’n., 362 N.L.R.B. 167 (2015). 
 204. Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1339 (6th Cir. 1983). 
 205. See Macy v. Eric Holder; See also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S at 429 – 30. 
 206. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–4; Title IX and Sex Discrimination, OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, 
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/tix_dis.html (last updated Apr. 2015). 
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scrutiny.  The EEOC’s interpretations when subjected to judicial review 
may receive some deference. 
The U.S. Supreme Court decided in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.207 that 
certain nonadversarial decisions or rulings of a statute’s administrator, 
while not binding upon the courts, may be entitled some deference because 
the rulings “constitute a body of experience and informed judgment” which 
have “the power to persuade” the court.208  Additionally, the Court in 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc.209 held that when an agency is 
specifically assigned to administer the statute, the amount of deference 
requires a two-step test.210  The first step is whether Congress has directly 
spoken to the precise question at issue, if the intent of Congress is clear.211  
If the answer is yes, the agency, as well as the reviewing court, must give 
deference to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.212  If the 
statute is ambiguous, the second step, the question becomes whether the 
agency’s interpretation of the statute is a “permissible construction,” or 
reasonable interpretation, of the statute.213 
There also exists another level of deference pursuant to Auer v. 
Robbins214  An agency is only limited by the agency’s enabling statute.215  
An agency’s interpretation of its own regulations and regulatory scheme 
will survive judicial scrutiny if it is deemed reasonable and consistent with 
previous agency interpretations.216  The Fourth Circuit ultimately used Auer 
deference in G.G and deferred to the OCR’s interpretation.217 
If the EEOC opine similar conclusions as the OCR, deeming it a 
violation of Title VII to deny transgender student athletes access to the 
corresponding sex-segregated teams, would it receive the same Auer 
deference by courts?  The question remains unanswered.  Before a court 
could begin inquiry into whether such an action was allowed, the question 
of whether the EEOC’s interpretation was entitled to deference—likely to 
be Chevron deference—in its inclusion of gender identity in “sex” pursuant 
to Title VII must be answered first.  The reliance on of judicially-created 
tests to determine who is or is not an “employee” also muddies the waters. 
 
 207. 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
 208. Id. at 140. 
 209. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 210. Id. at 842 – 43. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. at 843. 
 213. Id.  
 214. 519 U.S. 452 (1977). 
 215. Id. (holding that an agency is only limited in their creation of regulations by their 
enabling statute). 
 216. G.G., 822 F.3d at 721 (citing Auer, 519 U.S. at 461). 
 217. Id. at 723. 
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The history of deference to the policy interpretations of EEOC 
decisions has been controversial.  Courts have held that the EEOC does not 
have the authority to create rules and regulations, but the interpretative 
rulings should be given some weight and deference.218  This type of 
deference renders the agency’s interpretations of the statute all bark and no 
bite, and is more akin to Skidmore deference.219 
One coup for the EEOC interpretative guidelines was the 
interpretation of employer in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,220 the Court 
upheld the EEOC’s interpretation of the word “employer” to include “any 
agent of an employer.”221  The Court gave deference to the EEOC because 
the interpretative guidelines based on its enabling statute were created with 
a “body of experience and informed judgment.”222  Yet, in Vance v. Ball 
State University,223 the Court rejected EEOC’s interpretative guidelines on 
the term “supervisor.”224  The majority concluded that the EEOC’s 
interpretation was “too ambiguous” with no meaningful restraint on 
employer liability.225 
The reason for this may be that the EEOC tends to be more liberal 
with their interpretations than the Supreme Court.226  Some scholars 
suggested this shift may be the result of the Court’s increasingly 
conservative ideologies.227  Other factors to consider may also be the 
Court’s consideration of the larger legal landscape when interpreting a 
statute.228  But, whatever the reason may be, this conservative era of 
deference may not bode well for a more inclusive interpretation of 
“because of sex.” 
In the past, appellate circuits have been hostile towards the inclusion 
of transgender plaintiffs in “sex.”229  While gender identity’s inclusion in 
 
 218. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 – 42 (1976); See EEOC v. Arabian 
American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257 (1991). See also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 
405 (1975). 
 219. Chevron and Auer deference require more deference to agency interpretations while 
Skidmore deference has a lesser deferential requirement. 
 220. 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986). 
 221. Id. at 72. 
 222. Id. at 65. 
 223. 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013). 
 224. Id. at 2443 – 48. 
 225. Id. at 2449. 
 226. Symposium, Chevron At 30: Looking Back And Looking Forward: Chevron And 
Skidmore In The Workplace: Unhappy Together, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 497, 510 (the EEOC’s 
interpretation are more than 90% pro-employee compared to the 64% pro-employee Supreme 
Court interpretative opinions of Title VII). 
 227. Id. at 512. 
 228. Id. at 520 – 25. 
 229. See Sommers, 667 F.2d at 749; Holloway, 566 F.2d at 663; Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 21 – 22. 
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“because of sex” is still being litigated in the lower courts, Title VII may be 
the best chance transgender student athletes have at getting needed 
protection.  The Court should apply the Chevron deference standard to the 
EEOC’s interpretation of the term “because of sex” and Auer deference 
standard to any opinions or guidance about who is an employee and when 
they are protected due to the fact the EEOC is the executive agency tasked 
with the protections of all discriminatory employment matters. 
IX.  Conclusion 
Since the days of the Civil Rights Movement until the present day, 
different social movements use the courts to seek protections when 
Congress has seemed unable or unwilling to provide protection.  When 
Title VII and Title IX were first enacted, Congress may not have predicted 
that people may so fluidly change their gender identities.  Yet, Congress 
provided tools to stamp out prejudice. 
In today’s world, transgender individuals still face many legal 
obstacles.  Transgender student athletes should be allowed to be included 
on the sex-segregated team that matches with their gender identity.  The 
fight for protection under Title IX is just starting.  But its employment 
discrimination counterpart Title VII has a rich history that may provide 
transgender student athletes with protection.  When considering the totality 
of circumstances based on the law of agency under the “employee test,” 
student athletes should be deemed employees. 
Courts should remember what the original purpose of Title VII is, give 
deference to the EEOC, and ensure a maximum amount of societal 
protections.  Until courts realize that transgender athletes should be 
recognized under Title VII, many will continue to be penalized “because of 
sex.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
